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The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed
Promise of Administrative Federalism
Wayne A. Logan*
Introduction
With the realization that the Rehnquist Court’s judicial federalism revolution was perhaps not so revolutionary after all,1 scholars
increasingly have looked to alternate institutions to preserve state autonomy and related federalism values. The most obvious candidate,
Congress, has disappointed, persisting in its tendency to intrude on
state interests by means of such vehicles as the Commerce Clause2 and
by evading political3 and process4 federalism safeguards. Attention
has thus shifted to the federal executive branch, an increasingly dominant lawmaking force in modern-day America.5
Scholars have suggested a variety of ways to temper federal
agency prerogatives vis-à-vis the states, ranging from resuscitating the
nondelegation doctrine6 to curtailing preemption authority, which one
* Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Rachel Barkow, Jerry Mashaw, Gillian
Metzger, Mark Seidenfeld, Catherine Sharkey, and attendees of the ABA Annual Administrative Law Conference in Washington, D.C., for their helpful comments.
1 See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 38–39 (2001); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 81–82 (2001).
2 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 369, 379–91 (surveying caselaw showing the modest effect of Lopez in promoting successful challenges to federal exercises of Commerce Clause authority).
3 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–47
(1954) (maintaining that state election of federal representatives serves as a political check on
interference with states’ rights); see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 223–27 (2000) (updating Wechsler’s
seminal article and discussing the failure of political checks to ensure protection of state
authority).
4 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1379–90 (2001) (noting congressional attempts to evade constitutional constraints
and requirements in lawmaking).
5 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time,
the sheer amount of law . . . made by the [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the
lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.”).
6 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 610 (2009); Scott
A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative Encroachment,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 57–58 (2008).
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commentator has called “the central federalism issue of our time.”7
Of late, such traditional negative limits have been complemented by
positive assertions that agencies are actually best suited institutionally
to serve federalism interests. Several respected scholars have recently
argued that, rather than acting as instruments of federal hegemony,
agencies possess superior capacity—compared to Congress and the
courts—to reflect and serve state values and concerns. Gillian Metzger, for instance, has gone so far as to characterize “administrative law
as the new federalism.”8 The idea, however, that agencies can be effective stewards and agents of federalism has inspired resistance, including from sitting members of the Supreme Court.9
To date, the competing positions have played out only in the theoretical realm. In keeping with the dearth of empirical information on
the internal workings of agencies more generally,10 claims of agency
superiority have been merely posited—not proven. This Essay examines the viability of the administrative federalism model, doing so
through the lens of the federal Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”),11 enacted
in July 2006 to reconfigure the nation’s network of state sex offender
registration and community notification laws.12 As will be evident, the
Department of Justice (“Justice”), charged by Congress with providing critically important substantive guidelines for the interpretation
and implementation of the AWA, neither sought nor incorporated
state views, to the states’ considerable consternation. Importantly, as
a result, the final regulatory outcomes, which states are expected to
adopt under congressional Spending Clause pressure, not only disre7 Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869 (2008); see also
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that preemption cases present “the true test of federalis[m]”).
8 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2023
(2008); see also id. at 2109 (“[A]dministrative law has significant potential to advance state interests within the framework of the national administrative state.”); accord Catherine M. Sharkey,
Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2153 (2009) (“With
respect to promoting federalism values, ‘agencies . . . emerge as the institutional actor of choice,
to the extent that they effectively represent state interests in our modern administrative state.’ ”
(citation omitted)).
9 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are
clearly not designed to represent the interests of States . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 8, at 2085 (“[S]urprisingly little empirical evidence exists
on federal-state interactions in rulemaking and other procedural contexts of particular relevance
to administrative law.”).
11 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2006).
12 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 102, 120
Stat. 587, 590 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901).
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garded state autonomy; they also lacked the significant practical wisdom and insights of states, secured by decades of experience with
registration and community notification.
This Essay has four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
literature on administrative federalism. Part II examines the rulemaking process undertaken by Justice to craft the critically important
AWA guidelines. Part III examines how the federalism-enforcing
benefits posited by advocates of administrative federalism size up
against the reality of the actual rulemaking efforts of Justice. Using
the AWA as a case study, this Essay casts significant doubt on the
empirical assumptions of administrative federalism, adding to the limited empirical record amassed on state influence on agency rulemaking and providing an important object lesson for future agency-based
criminal justice mandates that will likely come to pass.
I. Administrative Federalism
Recent scholarship on the reputed federalism-enforcing benefits
of agencies has rested on two main contentions. First, that federal
agencies are naturally inclined to serve and reflect state interests in
rulemaking by virtue of the organic functional connection between the
federal government and states. According to Larry Kramer, for instance, “[t]he federal government needs the states as much as the reverse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in
the [rulemaking] process.”13 State influence is further ensured, Nina
Mendelson has reasoned, because federal officials are wary of the political fallout likely associated with their disregard of state interests.14
13 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994); see also
Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About
Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 193 (2004) (asserting that “federal
dependence on the knowledge and resources of cooperating state regulators” ensures a degree
of federal agency sensitivity to state interests); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment
as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001) (describing “picket-fence
federalism,” whereby “state and federal agency experts within the same specialty—the ‘posts’ in
the ‘fence’—often share more in common with each other than they do with the level of government by which they are employed”). For earlier recognitions of this phenomenon, see DANIEL J.
ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972) (noting that
because federal authorities rely on states to achieve their policy goals, they heed their concerns
and “are prepared to make concessions to their state counterparts”); MORTON GRODZINS, THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 75–80 (1966) (discussing state/federal “sharing through proximity,” using examples of various federal regulatory
agencies).
14

(2004).

Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741, 775–78
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A second main contention is that the workings of the administrative process itself offer superior opportunities for states to influence
federal policy, especially compared to Congress and the courts. In
support of this institutional superiority, administrative federalism advocates point to a variety of mechanisms,15 including the notice-andcomment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”)16 and Executive Order 13,132, which oblige agencies to consider the federalism implications of their rulemaking activities.17
Agencies thus enjoy, as Nina Mendelson has asserted, “a comparative
advantage in considering federalism benefits that are national in nature, such as the value of encouraging state policy experimentation
and the value of dividing power between different levels of government.”18 In all, Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld have argued that the
federal administrative apparatus is best suited to decide questions implicating state/federal allocations of power, and to reach comparatively enlightened regulatory results.19
II. Adam Walsh Act Rulemaking
From a federalism perspective, sex offender registration and community notification laws would appear especially inapt candidates for
federal regulatory attention. The laws seek the social control of convicted sex offenders, an issue squarely within the historic police power
authority of state governments,20 not the limited legislative aegis of
Congress.21 Indeed, for decades, state/federal relations conformed to
See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 8, at 2084–85.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
17 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006). The Order, inter alia, discourages “one-size-fits-all approaches to public policy
problems” and urges deference “to the States when taking action that affects the policymaking
discretion of the States . . . .” Id. at 43,256.
18 Mendelson, supra note 14, at 777; see also Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy:
Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–82 (1999) (regarding agency
rulemaking as the most “accessible,” “meaningful,” and “effective” avenue for public input).
19 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2020 (2008).
20 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(defining state police powers as extending “to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people . . . .”); see also Santiago Legarre,
The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 747–48 (2007)
(“American federalism cannot be fully understood without reference to the police power, for . . .
‘police power’ was the name Americans chose in order to designate the whole range of legislative power not delegated to the federal government and thus retained by the states.” (footnote
omitted)).
21 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (“Our national government is
one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice
15
16
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this norm: from their origin in the 1930s through the 1980s, registration and community notification laws were the subject of exclusive
state and local initiative and control.22
In 1994, however, registration and notification caught the attention of Congress.23 Concerned that law enforcement lacked readily
available information on previously convicted offenders to facilitate
the apprehension of offenders in the event of a recidivist sexual or
child-related offense, Congress required that states adopt registration
laws and allowed for, but did not require, community notification.24
Even though, at the time, some twenty-four states had registries, a
federal “stick”25 was needed “to prod all States to enact similar laws
and to provide for a national registration system to handle offenders
who move from one State to another.”26 The Jacob Wetterling Act,27
signed into law by President Clinton in September 1994, did so by
threatening to withhold from states ten percent of allocated federal
crime-fighting funds under the Byrne Formula Grant Program if they
failed to adopt congressionally prescribed registration requirements
by a specified date.28
rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has
created offenses against the United States.” (citation omitted)).
See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMNOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 20–84 (2009). Modern-era registration laws were first
enacted by local governments around Los Angeles in the early 1930s and sought to monitor
“gangsters” feared to be flooding the area from Midwestern and Eastern cities. Id. at 22. California enacted the first statewide registration law in 1947, targeting convicted sex offenders. Id.
at 30. Subsequent years witnessed only modest interest among states and localities. Id. at 46.
Things changed in 1990 when Washington State, reacting to the horrific sexual mutilation of a
child by a released sex offender, enacted the nation’s first community notification provision,
which permits registrants’ identifying information to be disseminated to the communities in
which they live. Id. at 49–51. Since then, and especially after the 1994 rape and murder of
seven-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey, the laws have enjoyed nationwide force. Id. at
54–55.
22

MUNITY

23 For a fuller account of federal involvement in the area, see Wayne A. Logan, Criminal
Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51 (2008).
24

See id. at 60–84.

25

139 CONG. REC. 31,251 (1993) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).

26

Id. (statement of Rep. Ramstad).

Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
27

28 See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2042 (1994) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14071(e)). The ten percent figure marked a significant decrease from prior bills. As
originally proposed by Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) in 1991, the legislation required
that noncompliant states be totally barred from receiving Byrne Grant funds, and the proposed
loss was later lowered to twenty-five percent in 1991. See Logan, supra note 23, at 66 n.87.
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Community notification attracted congressional attention again
in May 1996 with Megan’s Law,29 which required that states publicly
release identifying information on registrants.30 Concerned that states
were “reluctant” to employ community notification,31 and that a lack
of notification in some twenty states might leave communities vulnerable and encourage individuals to migrate to achieve anonymity,32
Congress unanimously passed the legislation.33 Once again, Congress
required that states comply with federal requirements if they wished
to receive their full allocation of Byrne Grant funds.34
During the 1990s, the federal-funding stick proved remarkably
successful, with every United States jurisdiction enacting registration
and community notification laws by 1999.35 Federal laws in succeeding years pressured states to adopt a variety of additional requirements and policies, including use of the Internet to facilitate
community notification.36
Such changes, although significant, pale in comparison to those
required by the AWA, passed by voice votes with nearly three dozen
cosponsors and quickly signed into law by President Bush in July
2006.37 Motivated by congressional concern over the perceived patchwork of weak state laws containing loopholes permitting individuals to
evade registration and notification,38 the AWA sought to establish a
Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (2006).
See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 101-145, §§ 1–2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(2) (1996)).
31 142 CONG. REC. 10,310–11 (1996) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
32 See Minor and Miscellaneous Bills (Part 2): Hearing on H.R. 1143, H.R. 1144, H.R. 1145,
H.R. 2092, H.R. 2137, H.R. 2453, H.R. 2587, H.R. 2607, H.R. 2641, H.R. 2650, H.R. 2803, H.R.
2804, H.R. 2974, H.R. 2980, H.R. 2996, Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 98–100 (1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
33 See Logan, supra note 23, at 69.
34 See Megan’s Law § 2, 110 Stat. at 1345.
35 LOGAN, supra note 22, at 65.
36 Logan, supra note 23, at 72–74.
37 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2006)).
38 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-218, pt. 1, at 23–24 (2005); 152 CONG. REC. S8018 (daily ed.
July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allen); 152 CONG. REC. S8022 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. DeWine); 151 CONG. REC. H7889 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Green). As Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a co-sponsor of the bill, explained, the AWA created
“uniform standards for the registration of sex offenders,” emphasizing that it was
critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State attempts to identify and keep track of sex offenders. . . . Laws regarding registration for sex offenders have not been consistent from State to State[;] now all States will lock arms and
present a unified front in the battle to protect children. Web sites that have been
weak in the past, due to weak laws and haphazard updating and based on inaccu29
30
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“comprehensive national system for the registration of sex offenders
and offenders against children.”39 The law contains an unprecedented
array of new registration and notification requirements, including a
significant expansion in the scope of eligibility (e.g., adjudicated
juveniles) and more onerous registration standards (e.g., in-person information verification, perhaps on a quarterly basis).40 As before,
Congress required that states wishing to receive Byrne Grant funds
conform to the AWA’s requirements by a specified date—in this instance July 200941 —subject to extension by Justice.42
Of particular importance here, the AWA, like predecessor federal
registration and notification laws, delegates broad general rulemaking
authority to Justice43 and specific authority to determine if the AWA is
to be retroactively applied to individuals convicted before the law’s

rate information, will now be accurate, updated, and useful for finding sex
offenders.
152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8013 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Ernie Allen,
President and CEO of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, testifying before
the House Judiciary Committee, emphasized that “[t]he amount of protection a child is given
shouldn’t depend on the state in which that child lives. There is clearly a need for more uniformity among State programs of community notification of sex offenders.” Protecting Our Nation’s
Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to Be Done? Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, President and CEO, The National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children). A “seamless, coordinated, uniform system that works” was
needed, and states should disclose information on all registrants, not merely those deemed most
likely to recidivate. Id.
39 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
40 For a full discussion of these and other changes required by the AWA, see Logan, supra
note 23, at 76–80.
41 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912(a), 16924(a).
42 The AWA provides that jurisdictions have until one year after the Attorney General
makes available computer software for the establishment and operation of “uniform sex offender registries and Internet sites,” if the software is available later than July 2009. Id.
§ 16923(a). The Attorney General is also authorized to permit up to two one-year extensions of
the initial July 2009 deadline. Id. § 16924(b). As of this writing, the software is not available and
Justice has extended the compliance deadline to July 2010. Att’y Gen. Order No. 3081-2009
(May 26, 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/sornaorder.pdf.
43 Technically, Congress directed the Office of the Attorney General and a new regulatory
entity under its control, the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART”), to create and administer the guidelines. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 16912(b) (delegating authority to “issue guidelines and regulations to interpret and implement” the AWA’s provisions); id. § 16945(a) (creating and specifying the duties of SMART).
Here, for ease of reference, reference is made to Justice.

1000

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 78:993

enactment,44 a controversial issue with major policy significance and
practical ramifications for states.45
In February 2007, Justice acted upon its delegated authority on
the retroactivity issue and promulgated an interim rule to take effect
on February 28, 2007,46 intended to serve the “immediately necessary
purpose” of making indisputably clear that the AWA applies retroactively.47 Retroactivity was warranted because nonretroactivity would
result in a
system for registration of sex offenders [that] would be far
from “comprehensive,” and would not be effective in protecting the public from sex offenders because most sex offenders who are being released into the community or are
now at large would be outside of its scope for years to
come.48
The rule required all “sex offenders,” as defined by the AWA, to register, regardless of when they were convicted.49
Furthermore, Justice specified that its interim rule was to be implemented immediately, without the APA’s usual requirements of a
thirty-day delay and opportunity for public notice and comment.50 It
invoked the APA’s “good cause” exception, which is available when
observance of the requirements would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”51 Justice supported its deci44 See id. § 16913(d) (“[Justice] shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the
requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter
or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of
any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders . . . .”). In addition, Congress
delegated authority to Justice on several less significant issues. See id. § 16914(a)(7) (providing
authority to expand the scope of information, specified by the AWA, that registrants must provide state authorities for inclusion in registries); id. § 16918(b)(4) (providing authority to augment the kinds of information falling under the AWA’s list of “mandatory exemptions” from
community notification (e.g., the Social Security numbers of registrants)).
45 See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text (discussing concerns raised by states over
federal imposition of retroactivity requirement).
46 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894,
8,895 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).
47 Id. at 8,896 (“The current rulemaking serves the . . . immediately necessary purpose of
foreclosing any dispute as to whether [the AWA] is applicable where the conviction for the predicate sex offense occurred prior to the enactment of [the AWA]. This issue is of fundamental
importance to the initial operation of [the AWA], and to its practical scope for many years, since
it determines the applicability of [the AWA’s] requirements to virtually the entire existing sex
offender population.”).
48 Id.
49 See id. at 8,897.
50 Id. at 8,896.
51 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3) (2006)).

2010]

The Failed Promise of Administrative Federalism

1001

sion by citing the dangers thought to be associated with delaying
registration of individuals with preenactment convictions, stating:
Delay in the implementation of this rule would impede the
effective registration of such sex offenders and would impair
immediate efforts to protect the public from sex offenders
who fail to register through prosecution and the imposition
of criminal sanctions. The resulting practical dangers include
the commission of additional sexual assaults and child sexual
abuse or exploitation offenses by sex offenders that could
have been prevented had local authorities and the community been aware of their presence, in addition to greater difficulty in apprehending perpetrators who have not been
registered and tracked as provided by [the AWA].52
In addition, despite the obvious federalism implications of the
AWA, which would revamp, sometimes radically, detailed and often
quite distinct registration and notification laws in all fifty states,53 Justice asserted that a federalism impact assessment under Executive Order 13,132 was not necessary, as its retroactivity rule would “not have
substantial direct effects on States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or on the distribution of power

52 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894,
8,896–97 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72). The explanation, however, was not entirely convincing, given that the provision was to take effect almost seven months to the day after
the AWA’s enactment and almost thirteen years after the Jacob Wetterling Act, not to mention
the near two-year pendency of the AWA itself and the reality that persons retroactively targeted
possibly had not committed a sexual offense for many years. Indeed, given the destabilizing
effects of registration and notification (the latter in particular) on individuals, it could be asserted that retroactivity actually increased public safety concerns. For discussion of the research
on such effects, see Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV.
147, 187–89 (2000).

Of late, federal circuits have disagreed over whether Justice’s AWA rulemaking satisfied the
“good cause” exceptions relative to a provision in the AWA making it a federal felony to cross
state lines without registering. Compare United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 420–24 (6th Cir.
2009) (finding the standard not satisfied, by a 2–1 vote), with United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d
459, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding the standard satisfied, by a 2–1 vote), and United States v.
Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008) (unanimously condemning the claim as “frivolous”),
cert. granted sub nom. Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (2009). One aspect of this dispute
concerns whether courts should examine the agency resort to “good cause” under a de novo or
“ ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ ” standard of review. See Cain, 583 F.3d at 434 n.4 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2006)). As the Sixth Circuit concluded in Cain, finding a lack of good cause has
particular persuasive appeal given the heavy burden traditionally thought required to invoke the
exception and the importance of advance notice vis-à-vis criminal prohibitions. Id. at 423.
53

See Logan, supra note 23, at 76–82.
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and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”54 Justice also specified, again without apparent justification, that “[t]here
has been substantial consultation with state officials regarding the interpretation and implementation” of the rule.55
Although the interim retroactivity rule took immediate effect,
Justice stated that it would receive comments through April 30, 2007.56
With limited awareness of the rulemaking among state authorities and
related organizations, only a handful of comments were filed before
the deadline.57 Almost all objected to the retroactive application of
the AWA, expressing concerns over its fairness and adverse impact on
state resources, with many parties expressing particular concern over
the impact of retroactivity on adjudicated juvenile offenders.58
Among the comments filed was a letter from the National Conference
of State Legislatures stating its opposition to retroactivity “so as to
respect state sovereignty over the treatment of sex offenders as laid
out in each state’s respective sex offender registry provisions.”59
On May 17, 2007, without publishing a response to comments received,60 Justice released its proposed guidelines for the AWA as a
whole, including elaboration on the contours of retroactivity, and
specified August 1, 2007, as the deadline for public comment.61 Justice
stated that registration would extend to all statutorily defined “sex
offenders . . . if they remain in the system as prisoners, supervisees, or
registrants or if they later reenter the system because of conviction for
54

Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. at

8,897.
55

Id.

56

See id. at 8,895.

See Telephone Interview with Kay Cohen, Deputy Executive Dir., Nat’l Criminal Justice
Ass’n (Apr. 17, 2009) (transcript on file with author); Telephone Interview with Susan Parnas
Frederick, Fed. Affairs Counsel, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Apr. 17, 2009) (transcript on file with author); see also Letter from Joe A. Garcia, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am.
Indians, to David J. Karp, Office of Legal Policy (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ncai.
org/ncai/resource/documents/governance/Adam_Walsh_Act/interim_rule_comments_final.pdf,
at 3 (“Indian tribes were not consulted during the development of the Adam Walsh Act or the
interim rule, and have not been asked to give input into other guidelines that are currently being
developed by [Justice].”).
57

58 See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed.
Reg. 38,030, 38,030–32 (July 2, 2008).
59 Letter from Susan Parnas Frederick, Fed. Affairs Counsel, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, to David Karp, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr.
23, 2007) (on file with author).
60 See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 477 (4th Cir. 2009) (Michael, J., dissenting).
61 See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed.
Reg. 30,209, 30,210–13 (proposed May 30, 2007).
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some other crime (whether or not the new crime is a sex offense).”62
Thus, if individuals are convicted in the distant past of an offense warranting registration under the AWA and later commit a nonsexual offense such as embezzlement, they are subject to registration,
potentially for their lifetimes.
The proposed guidelines were the subject of a forum in Indianapolis, Indiana, from July 24–27, 2007, just before the comment deadline,
which the author attended. State representatives and criminal justice
professionals vigorously criticized the guidelines and the administrative process leading to their creation. These sentiments, especially relating to the question of retroactivity, were echoed in written
comments lodged with Justice. A letter from the chair of Idaho’s
Criminal Justice Commission, for instance, condemned the “breadth
of the duties of the state” resulting from the retroactivity requirement,
calling it “an onerous and unworkable burden on the state and its limited resources.”63
Similarly, a letter jointly signed by the heads of six New York
state agencies concerned with implementation of the law urged that
jurisdictions be afforded discretion on the retroactivity question:
When each state first created its sex offender registry, it
made a choice about how the registration requirements
would be applied to previously convicted offenders.
The decision on retroactive applicability raises substantial
practical and policy concerns that are more appropriately addressed by the individual states. [Part of the guidelines] will
greatly expand the pool of registerable sex offenders in New
York State. It will also require the State to search the prior
criminal history of each person entering the criminal justice
system to determine whether, at any time in the past, he or
she was convicted of, or adjudicated for, a qualifying sex offense. This is both burdensome and unworkable because in
many cases older records will no longer be available, or they
will be incomplete or inaccurate.64
62

Id. at 30,228.

Letter from Brent D. Reinke, Chairman, Idaho Criminal Justice Comm’n, to Laura L.
Rogers, Dir., SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 31, 2007),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at 622–23.
63

64 Letter from Denise O’Donnell, Comm’r, N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs. et
al., to Laura L. Rogers, Dir., SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(July 31, 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at
740–44.
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The New York letter added that retroactivity expanded the pool of
registerable offenders, which would “exacerbate the difficulties that
states are now facing in finding appropriate housing for sex
offenders.”65
States also expressed more global concerns over the proposed
guidelines. Virginia, for instance, stated that the “proposed regulations would be extremely cumbersome to implement and cause Virginia to devote significant resources to the collection of information
which would be of limited use. Those states with strong registration
programs should have the option of implementing the proposed regulations.”66 The National Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”)
commented that the proposed guidelines “compound the burdensome, preemptive scheme of the underlying law [the AWA] they seek
to clarify.”67 In a posting to its website, the NCSL condemned the
AWA’s “one-size-fits all approach” and harshly criticized Justice’s failure to consider state interests in its proceedings, stating:
These provisions preempt many state laws and create an unfunded mandate for states because there are no appropriations in the Act or in any appropriations bill. Many of the
provisions of the Adam Walsh Act were crafted without state
input or consideration of current state practices. The mandates imposed by the Adam Walsh Act are inflexible and, in
some instances, not able to be implemented.68
In June 2008, thirteen months after being proposed, and well after the projected three-month period of revision, Justice issued its Fi65 Id. Other states voiced similar concerns over the increased burden associated with retroactivity. See E-mail from Diane Sherman, Mich. Criminal Justice Info. Ctr., Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, to SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 2, 2007,
5:52 PM), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at 619–20
(“Retroactivity puts a work load burden on states. Much research will be needed on old laws to
determine whether they apply to . . . registration.”); E-mail from Janet Neely, Cal. Deputy Attorney Gen., to SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 26, 2007, 7:46
PM), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at 727–39 (asserting that creation of a database containing superseded statutes of California and other states
“is not a feasible project”).
66 Letter from W. S. Flaherty, Superintendent, Va. State Police, to Laura L. Rogers, Dir.,
SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 31, 2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at 601–05.
67 Letter from Carl Tubbesing, Deputy Executive Dir., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, to Laura L. Rogers, Dir., SMART Office, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(July 30, 2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf, at
590–95.

NAL

68 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2008–2009 POLICIES: LAW AND CRIMIJUSTICE COMMITTEE, http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/lawandj.htm (last visited May 10, 2010).
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nal AWA Guidelines.69 Running sixty pages in length, the guidelines
reflected little substantive change from those initially proposed,70 with
Justice rebuffing state concerns either because they purportedly contradicted the terms of the AWA itself or failed to qualify as persuasive
bases to alter proposed guideline requirements.71 The guidelines
maintained their original position on retroactivity, dismissing state
concerns as merely sounding in “unfair[ness]” or being “disagreeable
from the standpoint of sex offenders.”72 In response to state requests
for a more generous interpretation of the AWA’s requirement of
“substantial compliance,” Justice offered that doing so would “effectively treat [the AWA] as a set of suggestions for furthering public
safety in relation to released sex offenders, which could be dispensed
with based on arguments that other approaches would further that
general objective, though not encompassing the specific minimum
measures that [the AWA] prescribes . . . .”73
III. Testing the Tenets of Administrative Federalism
As the foregoing suggests, the posited federalism benefits of
agency rulemaking did not come to fruition with the AWA. Contrary
to expectations that the U.S. would collaborate with states74 and be
sensitive to their interests,75 Justice turned a deaf ear, from the early
suspension of notice-and-comment requirements and the guideline
69 The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg.
38,030 (July 2, 2008).
70 See id. Federal policy on the parameters of the registration of juveniles is a narrow
exception. Apparently in response to state objections based on a technical reading of the AWA
that would require registration of juveniles for less serious offenses (such as a fourteen-year-old
having sex with an eleven-year-old), the Final Guidelines deviate from the AWA. In apparent
violation of its required mandate to interpret, not prescribe, registration standards, Justice devised a meaning that was less onerous than the one tied to the “aggravated sexual abuse” standard prescribed by the AWA itself. See id. at 38,040–41.
71 See generally id.
72 Id. at 38,035–36.
73 Id. at 38,036; see also id. at 38,037 (rejecting the view that the AWA represents “mere
advice” to states).
74 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 19, at 1957 (“Representatives of interest
groups . . . do have access to the staff members in each of the offices represented on a rulemaking team.” (citation omitted)); Mendelson, supra note 14, at 774 (“Although agencies may not
have incorporated the more abstract benefits of ‘federalism’ . . . [they] do appear to have systematically consulted with states. Thus, they may be honoring state interests as states have expressed them.”).
75 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 19, at 1973 (“The states have proven to be
effective at influencing agencies to preserve their state prerogatives.”); Metzger, supra note 8, at
2085 n.228 (“Anecdotal evidence also exists of notice-and-comment requirements having a stateprotective impact.”).
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pre-proposal phase (a critically important time76) through promulgation of the final guidelines.77 Furthermore, contrary to claims of superior agency awareness of and dedication to the value of state
experimentation,78 Justice resolutely resisted extensive state input and
dismissed state pleas for flexibility.79
The evidence proffered here thus supplements and supports the
limited empirical record amassed on the meager influence of noticeand-comment procedures.80 It also aligns with prior work showing the
effective irrelevance of Executive Order 13,132,81 with Justice giving
short shrift to the impact that its rulemaking would have on registration and community notification systems, which have enormous policy
and resource implications for state governments.82
The disappointing saga assumes heightened significance given the
broader institutional failure marking the AWA’s history. Here, it
bears mention, the advocates of administrative federalism are right on
the mark when they question the efficacy of other branches. Congress
did a notably poor job of involving states during the two-year genesis
of the AWA, utilizing a fast-track legislative process characterized by
truncated debate and limited factfinding dominated by self-confirmatory partisan committee testimonials.83
Federal legislators unanimously required that states adopt an unprecedented array of significant changes to their registration and notification systems, which not only remain empirically unverified,84 but
which, taken together, perhaps most closely resemble the regime of
76 See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting
the importance of “affected parties hav[ing] an opportunity to participate in and influence
agency decision making at an early stage, when the agency is more likely to give real consideration to alternative ideas”); see also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 79–80 (3d ed. 2003).
77 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
78 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 19, at 1976 (“[A]gencies are well suited for evaluating the benefits of both localism and the need for experimenting within the programs they
regulate.”).
79 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 424–25 (2005); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 621 (2002).
81 See, e.g., Nina Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 695, 719–22 (2008); Metzger, supra note 8, at 2085–86.
82 See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text; see also LOGAN, supra note 22, at 109–13
(surveying the impact of registration and notification on state resources).
83 See Logan, supra note 23, at 112–14 (discussing the AWA legislative process).
84 See LOGAN, supra note 22, at 109–33 (surveying limited research done on the effects
and consequences of registration and notification).
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one of the nation’s smallest states, Delaware, the home of an AWA
chief sponsor, then-Senator Joseph Biden.85 The sole indication of
congressional awareness of the federalism ramifications within the
AWA itself86 came with its concession that a state need not adopt any
of its provisions if doing so “would place the jurisdiction in violation
of its constitution, as determined by a ruling of the jurisdiction’s highest court.”87 If such a constitutional conflict exists, “the Attorney
General and the jurisdiction shall make good faith efforts to accomplish substantial implementation of [the law] and to reconcile any conflicts between [the AWA] and the jurisdiction’s constitution.”88 Under
the AWA, “the Attorney General shall consult with [state officials]
concerning the jurisdiction’s interpretation of the jurisdiction’s constitution and rulings thereon by the jurisdiction’s highest court.”89
Sensitivity to state autonomy, however, only goes so far. For instance, the AWA accords no respect to state legislative or executive
branch determinations relative to registration and notification. Only a
constitutionally commanded position, backed by a holding from the
state’s highest court (and seemingly not even a lowly intermediate appellate court), will suffice. Moreover, Congress promised that the federal government would “work with the jurisdiction to see whether the
problem can be overcome . . .”90—a notably unceremonious way to
refer to a state-based constitutional right. If a jurisdiction fails to
“substantially implement” the AWA in the absence of a legitimate,
“demonstrated inability” due to its own constitutional dictate, as certiSee Logan, supra note 23, at 114. Speaking to this symmetry, a member of the Connecticut General Assembly offered in 1998 that federal directives had “more to do with the needs of
the home States of the various congressional committee chairs than they do with our States. I
think this has been a source of great frustration for many State legislators around the country. . . . ‘One-size-fits-all’ [f]ederal requirements really do not apply . . . .” Mike Lawlor, Representative, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Creating Effective Sex Offender Legislation Requires
Collaboration Between Lawmakers and Justice Agencies, Paper Presented at the Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Conference: National Conference on Sex Offender Registries (Apr.
1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/Ncsor.pdf, at 86.
85

86 The only evidence of congressional willingness to actually consider state experience and
expertise came after the fact, with a directive that the Attorney General assemble a task force to
assess competing registrant classification approaches, consisting of persons who “represent national, State, and local interests” and possess expertise in relevant academic and experiential
areas. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 637, 120
Stat. 587, 646 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2006)).
87

42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(1) (2006).

88

Id. § 16925(b)(2).

89

Id.

The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg.
38,030, 38,041 (July 2, 2008) (emphasis added).
90
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fied by Justice, or otherwise cannot satisfy Justice with an accommodation, the jurisdiction will lose its federal funding.91 Adding insult to
injury, the share lost by a jurisdiction will be reallocated to its compliant peers.92
True to form, the courts as well have failed to temper congressional zeal. Nondelegation challenges have almost universally been
rejected,93 and the judicial record of finding fault with the failure of
Justice to comply with APA requirements, in particular those relating
to notice and comment, has been mixed.94
All of this is certainly not to take a side in the ongoing debate
over the preferred institutional capacity of any particular branch relative to federalism interests. Rather, the discussion is meant to underscore the fact that rulemaking should not be embraced as a basis to
redeem an otherwise flawed process. The tripartite system failure, in
which Justice’s efforts figured centrally,95 has predictably resulted in
42 U.S.C. § 16925(a).
See id. § 16925(c).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 857 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Samuels, 543 F. Supp. 2d 669, 677–78 (E.D. Ky. 2008). For an argument against the current
desuetude of the nondelegation doctrine relative to criminal justice authority in particular, see
Logan, supra note 23, at 115 n.367.
94 See supra note 52 (citing varied circuit outcomes relative to whether the APA’s “good
cause” standard to excuse notice and comment was satisfied). Individuals can, of course, mount
constitutional challenges—for instance, that retroactive application of the AWA violates ex post
facto principles. Alaska’s pre-AWA regime was deemed nonpunitive in character and was upheld against ex post facto challenge in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). Conceivably, the
AWA’s more stringent requirements could at some point result in a successful challenge, but
would fail to redress the concern addressed here. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers
and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006) (noting that individual constitutional
claims “act as poor safeguards against structural abuses and inequities”).
95 Perhaps the most public expression of state displeasure occurred in March 2009, when
Emma Devillier, a Louisiana Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the Sexual Predator Unit,
vigorously condemned the rulemaking process before a House Judiciary Committee Hearing on
Barriers to Implementation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Devillier
criticized Justice for, inter alia, its rigid, unrealistic interpretation of the AWA’s “substantial compliance” requirement; the major systemic consequences of the retroactivity rule; and the guidelines’ failure to take into account varied state criminal laws in their definitions. Devillier
testified that
[the AWA’s] offense-based (at least as interpreted by [Justice]), retroactive system
is over inclusive, overly burdensome on the state, exorbitantly costly, and will actually do more to erode community safety than to strengthen it. This is generally
true, I am advised, not just for Louisiana but for most states.
....
To ensure that federal legislation . . . is based on sound public policy and that it will
be effectively implemented, all stakeholders must be brought to the table.
Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA): Barriers to Timely Compliance by
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
91
92
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widespread dissatisfaction with the AWA, risking for the first time
since 1994 that the states will not comply with federal mandates.96 In
the face of sustained state criticism of the AWA and its guidelines,97 as
well as Justice’s widely understated assessment of the resource impact
on states,98 Justice has agreed to blanket extensions to the initial July
2009 deadline.99 To date, only four jurisdictions (Delaware, Ohio, and
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Emma J. Devillier, Assistant Att’y
Gen., La.); see also, e.g., Diane Jennings, States Wrestle with How to Fund Federal Sex Offender
Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 23, 2008, at 1A (discussing dissatisfaction among Texas
legislators over retroactivity policy).
96 See Logan, supra note 23, at 83–84 (surveying media reports indicating that many states
will not adopt AWA requirements due to costs and ideological opposition); see also Abigail
Goldman, Sex Offender Act Might Not Be Worth Its Cost to Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 15,
2009, at 1 (discussing sentiment in Nevada). Recently, the California Sex Offender Management
Board, which oversees the nation’s largest registration and notification system, issued the following statement:
The California State Legislature, Governor and citizens should elect not to come
into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act. Current effective California state law
and practice . . . is more consistent with evidence-based practice that can demonstrate real public policy outcomes.
Instead of incurring the substantial—and un-reimbursed—costs associated with the
Adam Walsh Act, California should absorb the comparatively small loss of federal
funds that would result from not accepting the very costly and ill-advised changes
to state law and policy required by the Act . . . .
CAL. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., ADAM WALSH ACT: STATEMENT OF POSITION (2009), available at http://www.opd.ohio.gov/AWA_Information/AWA_CA_SOMB_SORNA_Position_Paper.
pdf.
97 See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Abby Goodnough &
Monica Davey, Effort to Track Sex Offenders Draws Resistance from States, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2009, at A1 (noting a broad array of state criticisms, including that “[m]any states complain that
the new federal law disrupts and even clashes with their own carefully created policies for managing sex offenders”); Jennings, supra note 95, at 1A (discussing dissatisfaction among Texas
legislators over the juvenile registration requirement and the use of conviction-based registration, given the state’s perceived failed experimentation with the policies in recent years); Editorial, Tier Drop: State Should Revisit Sex Offender Rosters, THE OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 13, 2009, at
10A (noting that since Oklahoma amended its laws in 2007, in a failed early attempt to satisfy
the AWA, the number of registrants subject to lifetime registration nearly doubled from the
number registered under prior law); Memorandum of the Nat’l Criminal Justice Ass’n and the
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (June 12, 2009) (on file with author) (urging Justice “to
engage in meaningful consultation with state and local stakeholders in order to formulate reasonable rules and regulatory authority changes that address state concerns and provide a workable format for states to move forward with implementation of [the AWA]”).
98 See, e.g., Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8,894, 8,897 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72) (concluding that retroactivity will
not impose substantial costs on states). In California alone, authorities estimated that a partial
assessment of required changes would require an expenditure of $38 million, based on additional
record checks, more frequent reporting, and reclassification of registrants. See Goodnough &
Davey, supra note 97, at A13.
99 Att’y Gen. Order No. 3081-2009 (May 26, 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
smart/pdfs/sornaorder.pdf. A letter signed by Senate and House Judiciary Chairs and Ranking

1010

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 78:993

two small Indian reservations) have achieved “substantial compliance” as determined by Justice.100 Meanwhile, although Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has
signaled that the AWA might be in for a legislative overhaul,101 thus
far congressional resolve to reopen the law seems to be lacking.102
Conclusion
This paper has two chief goals: first, to augment the modest literature on the role of states in the federal agency rulemaking process;
and second, to test the empirical assumptions that have animated discourse on administrative federalism. With respect to the latter, Justice
rulemaking efforts relative to the AWA call into serious question the
soundness of recent assertions of the institutional superiority of agencies as guardians of state interests. Indeed, if, as advocates maintain,
the comparative institutional choice question turns on the empirical
question of which branch is best situated to serve federalism interests
and develop optimal public policy,103 the case study offered here fails
to inspire confidence. Justice gave short shrift to state autonomy and
ignored—and actually acted contrary to—the insights of state authorities, who have amassed considerable expertise in operating registration and notification systems since at least the early 1990s.
Before closing, it is worthwhile to note some caveats that might
be in order. For one, the subject area in question—criminal justice—
could be thought to be unique, such as to undermine the transferability of this case study.104 Compared to other areas of regulatory conMembers offered in support of an extension stated that “there have been unforeseen difficulties
in implementing the law and significant added costs . . . .” Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to
Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Mar. 19, 2009).
100 See Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Fourth Jurisdiction to Implement Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(May 6, 2010), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2010/SMART100
65.htm.
101 See Goodnough & Davey, supra note 97, at A13.
102 See Telephone Interview with Susan Parnas Frederick, Fed. Affairs Counsel, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Sept. 28, 2009) (transcript on file with author).
103 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 19, at 1969 (“Decisions about federalism are
often a choice of institutions . . . .”); id. at 1949 (“[T]he issue is not which institution best enables
state influence over regulation, but rather which institution fosters state influence that will enhance public welfare . . . .”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 779 (2008) (“Institutional choice analysis . . . rests ultimately on empirical judgments about the capabilities of different legal institutions.”).
104 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1308 (2009) (noting that individual case studies “are likely to be especially important,
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cern, such as pollution, pharmaceutical drugs, and the like, criminal
justice is a relatively uncommon target of federal agency attention.105
Indeed, the reasons typically thought to motivate congressional
agency delegations, such as political blame-shifting and interest group
pressure,106 are largely absent with criminal justice.107 So too, typically, is the need for technical expertise,108 a commonly voiced justification for agency delegation.109 The upshot of this is that Justice,
compared to agencies having more consistent exposure to the public
demands of rulemaking, was perhaps simply experientially ill
equipped to handle the task at hand.110
This experiential deficit, in turn, did not stand to be ameliorated
by any institutional imperative that might have obliged greater federal
as every administrative scheme is different and the conditions of bargaining between the states
and the federal government vary widely from context to context”); Sharkey, supra note 8, at
2155 (“Agencies, at least in theory, are equipped to make nuanced, flexible determinations regarding federal-state regulatory balance, based upon underlying policy considerations that may
vary by regulatory context.”). As Jody Freeman has pointed out, agency and regulatory context
can have direct bearing on the utility of the notice-and-comment process in particular. Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 n.27
(1997).
105 Several provisions of the APA itself attest to this exceptionalism. See, e.g., Ronald F.
Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 609 (2009) (noting public
rulemaking exceptions made for criminal law enforcement agencies). Nevertheless, other instances of federal criminal justice rulemaking can be readily found, including those evincing
disregard of state interests, such as the 2003 decision by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) to preempt state law requiring disclosure of the identities of inmates held in
state institutions. See Ronald K. Chen, State Incarceration of Federal Prisoners After September
11, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (2004) (discussing the INS rule and calling the agency’s conclusion that the rule lacked federalism implications “facially remarkable”).
106

See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 230–38 (1999).

Cf. Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political
Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1979–88
(2006) (noting how the commonly identified factors motivating congressional agency delegations
typically are not operative with respect to sentencing policy and practice).
107

108 Retroactive application of the AWA, for instance, represented nothing so much as a
political matter for resolution. On the political quality of agency decisions more generally, see,
for example, Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 1395, 1399 (1975) (observing that agencies make “ ‘political’ decisions in the highest sense of
that term”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35–37 (2009).
109 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 479–80 (2003).
110 This relative uniqueness, it is important to emphasize, should not be permitted to obscure the significance of the systemic breakdown evidenced here. For an insightful account of
the death of checks on the criminal law- and policymaking process, see generally Barkow, supra
note 94.
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cooperation with and deference to states,111 such as commonly occurs
with environmental regulations112 or those promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) relative to the REAL ID
Act of 2005.113 Other than the need for Justice to sign off on “substantial compliance,” the AWA and its accompanying regulations necessitate little regular state/federal coordination, freeing the federal
government to go it alone.
Moreover, it could be that sex offender policy in particular, with
its unique political salience and potency, is sui generis.114 Contemporary politicians, as is well known, do their utmost to out-tough one
another with respect to sex offenders.115 As a result, any members of
Congress who might have successfully pushed for mitigation of the
AWA’s onerous regime were absent from the scene. Also, unlike
other regulatory areas, no organized industry aligns with localism and
state autonomy, which might incentivize members of Congress to
pressure the agency toward flexibility and experimentation. On its
own, Justice—operating beyond the political klieg lights—failed to
temper congressional zeal, promulgating an inflexible slate of regulations in disregard of expressed state interests and desires.
Finally, and critically important, concern over federalism itself is
well known to vary in accord with the public policy at issue; federalism
is often at best a second-order priority, with substantive policy concerns taking precedence. This prioritization is certainly in evidence
with criminal justice policy, notwithstanding the historically predominant police power authority of states.116
Going forward, the story recounted here should serve as a cautionary tale of federal regulatory authority. Although agencies have
the potential to play a helpful role in sustaining federalism, in abstract
111 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the posited tendency toward state/
federal cooperation as a result of shared regulatory goals).
112 See Sharkey, supra note 8, at 2159.
113 See id. at 2150–52.
114 As I have noted elsewhere, this uniqueness is arguably manifest in the sustained congressional focus, since 1994, on registration and notification, in contrast to federal criminal justice initiatives during the time that pressured states to conform to federal sentencing desires,
which foundered. See Logan, supra note 23, at 122 n.406.
115 See LOGAN, supra note 22, at 85–108 (discussing the political catalysts behind the recent
wave of harsh measures targeting sex offenders).
116 See Logan, supra note 23, at 107. For instance, since registration and notification caught
the attention of Congress in the early 1990s, only a handful of federal legislators—all Democrats—have raised concerns over federal intrusions on state autonomy, a position that not coincidentally aligns with their typically more tempered approach to criminal justice matters. Id. at
104.
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or instrumental terms, or both, their success in doing so very much
depends on systemic change. As Gillian Metzger has observed,
“[u]ltimately, the success of efforts to integrate federalism and the
modern federal administrative state hinges on agencies—and their political masters in the executive branch and Congress—being willing to
trade off some degree of uniformity for the benefits of diversity, experimentation, and localism in setting regulatory policy.”117 This willingness would surely be fostered by an agency culture that assigns
importance to federalism values,118 combined with institutional mechanisms designed to enforce them.119 With the AWA, such traits were
in evidence at Justice, to the detriment of a criminal justice policy with
enormous ramifications for the states and the nation as a whole, leaving the promise of administrative federalism unfulfilled.
Despite the less-than-positive portrayal of agency behavior offered here, it is hoped that others will focus research energies on criminal justice rulemaking efforts. Even if unique, for reasons discussed,
rulemaking by Justice and other federal agencies (such as DHS) will
figure ever more centrally in American life. The perceived benefits of
nationalized policy, not to mention the powerful political appeal in
Congress of crime control and public safety, are simply too strong for
the outcome to be otherwise. By highlighting the reality of agency
dysfunction, if nothing else, this case study ideally will inspire calls for
greater executive branch sensitivity to federalism concerns as these
initiatives come to pass.

117 Metzger, supra note 8, at 2109; see also id. (asserting that “administrative law has significant potential to advance state interests within the framework of the national administrative
state”).
118 In a recent article, Catherine Sharkey identified a cluster of reforms intended to ensure
greater state/federal agency involvement, many of which are already specified in Executive Order 13,132, including: requiring regular and early consultation in the rulemaking process, the
designation of an ombudsman-like “federalism official,” and the creation of working groups of
interested parties with which the agency can consult. See Sharkey, supra note 8, at 2160,
2170–72.
119 See id. at 2172–91 (identifying “agency-forcing” measures, including possible codification of Executive Order 13,132, and making it judicially enforceable against agencies); see also
Metzger, supra note 8, at 2101–05 (urging a greater judicial role in ensuring agency fealty to
federalism interests).

